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Afterword
PHENOMOPHOBIA, OR WHO’S AFRAID  
OF MERLEAU-PONTY?
Bruce R. Smith
“Literary Criticism for the Twenty-first Century”: that special topic took 
up thirty-six double-columned pages of the October 2010 issue of PMLA. 
According to Jonathan Culler’s introduction to the issue, the section had 
its origins in an MLA session organized by the Division on Literary Crit-
icism. In addition to papers read at the session, there were more than 
fifty open submissions, but only one was accepted by the editorial board 
of PMLA.1 What does that say about the state of criticism in the early 
twenty-first century? Confusion? No clear sense of direction? Banality? 
In the event, nine papers were published, some of them general submis-
sions that were redirected to this special issue. Not one of the nine contrib-
utors uses the term “phenomenology.” Not one. Why should that be so?
A possible reason may be Culler’s identifying “the motif of the return” 
as the defining characteristic of twenty-first-century criticism, a return 
to previous concerns and methodologies, albeit with a difference in each 
case. Returns are the explicit subjects of three of the essays: a return to the 
political, to a purer Marxism (Jean-Jacques Lecercle); a return to decon-
struction, but without the political edge, in effect a purer deconstruction 
(Richard Klein); and a return to poetics (Simon Jarvis). Supposedly new 
directions are mapped out in six other essays: cognitive science (Monika 
Fludernik), trauma theory (Shelly Rambo), aesthetics (Sianne Ngai), per-
formance theory (Peggy Phelan), media studies (Meredith McGill and 
Andrew Parker), and literature and film (Ian Balfour). Or are these essays 
likewise variations on the motif of the return? If so, the absence of phe-
nomenology is all the more striking, since the phenomenologies practiced 
in this issue of Criticism represent a return to, and an updating, of early- to 
mid-twentieth-century concerns and methodologies in the work of Hus-
serl (1859–1938), Heidegger (1889–1976), and Merleau-Ponty (1908–61). 
Something else must be at work in the neglect of phenomenology.
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Implicitly, but not explicitly, phenomenology informs at least three of 
the essays in PMLA’s “Literary Criticism for the Twenty-first Century”: 
Ngai on three aesthetic categories (the zany, the cute, and the interest-
ing), Jarvis on poetics, and Phelan on performance theory. One reason 
aesthetic categories are neglected, Ngai notes, is the subjective element: 
“Like literary affects or tones, aesthetic categories such as cute and zany 
are thus unusually vulnerable to accusations of subjectivism and impres-
sionism.”2 Jarvis’s argument for an “historical poetics” calls for attention 
to the repertory of “expressive practices” available in a given time and 
place. The available techniques work like melodic and rhythmic phrases 
in music and brush technique in painting, practices that Jarvis reads as 
“gestures”: “The devices of verse have no fixed effects, but readers are 
seduced into conjecturing effects with them as they notice poets sinking 
the most powerful thoughts and feelings into even the most abject little 
phonetic and printed bits and pieces.”3 Phelan stresses the affects that at-
tend enactment as opposed to words. In all three cases, the focus is placed 
not on texts but on relationships, not on words but on the interpreters of 
those words and on the circumstances of interpretation. But phenomenol-
ogy goes unnamed.
Why this avoidance? Why this unspoken phenomophobia? Why this 
reluctance to name phenomenology and embrace it as a critical method? 
After all, MS Word 2010 has finally recognized “phenomenological” as 
a word that doesn’t call for a dotted red underline. Why, then, should 
attention to the physical, psychological, and social circumstances of inter-
pretation produce so much anxiety? Let me suggest five possible reasons:
1. The Gertrude Stein effect. Some critics fear that there 
is no “there” there. Despite thirty-five years of decon-
struction, many critics need a text as the object of analy-
sis—something right there in front of them, something 
just as present as a well-wrought urn was in New Criti-
cism, something that can be gestured toward even as 
it is being rejected. Phenomenology does not concern 
itself with objects of this sort; it is concerned with re-
lationships, between subject and object, among objects, 
among subjects.
2. The Narcissus effect. Ngai in his contribution to PMLA 
recognizes that aesthetics can be dismissed as mere self-
referentiality. What ground of authority does an indi-
vidual’s experience have? The resolute first-personhood 
of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty raises the 
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same fears. The social subject of New Historicism and 
cultural materialism seems much more objective.
3. The Oscar Wilde effect. Phenomenology is regarded by 
many critics as an exercise in political bad faith. Con-
cern with aesthetics and individual subjective experi-
ence is seen as a diversionary tactic, a mistaking of the 
superstructure for the base—and an abrogation of po-
litical responsibility.
4. The Euclid effect. In the last chapter of Phenomenal 
Shakespeare, I attempt to expose the closed-circuitry of 
much contemporary criticism. The critic begins with 
certain axioms and proceeds to demonstrate those axi-
oms at work in a particular text or texts that function as 
the equivalent of a geometrical figure. Once the axioms 
that are assumed to be correct in the first place are in fact 
demonstrated to be correct, the problem solver can write 
“Q.E.D.” at the end: quid erat demonstrandum, “which 
was to be demonstrated.”4 Phenomenology would seem 
to lack criteria for verification of the argument, to lack 
reproducibility of the interpretative experiment. The ad 
hoc way in which phenomenological critics cite Husserl, 
Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty is generally looser than 
the way in which deconstructionist critics cite Derrida 
or psychoanalytical critics cite Freud and Lacan or ma-
terialist critics cite Marx or Raymond Williams. First 
principles in phenomenology are not so well established.
5. The Miss Emily Grierson effect. If New Historicism 
began with Stephen Greenblatt’s desire to speak with 
the dead, phenomenology might be said to begin with a 
desire to feel with the dead, a form of necrophilia of the 
sort witnessed in Faulkner’s story “A Rose for Emily.” 
Many critics would reject the very possibility of recon-
structing what subjectivity was like in the past. The re-
sult, they say, is only an illusion of presence.
The essays collected in this issue of Criticism put the quietus to these 
five objections. The Gertrude Stein effect disappears if it is recognized that 
phenomenology does have a “there”: it exists not in objects but in rela-
tionships. Kevin Curran provides a paradigmatic example in his treat-
ment of criminality as “a dynamic relationship between ideas, objects, 
and bodies.” Macbeth’s crime is a matter of thoughts as well as deeds, of 
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daggers imagined and real. Ken Jackson questions the supposed objectiv-
ity of language-based criticism, exposing its fascination with the other, 
with that-which-cannot-be-named. By the same token, affect-based criti-
cism, with its focus on objects that occasion emotions, can be regarded as 
materialism in a new guise. The space between “the linguistic turn” and 
“the affective turn” is occupied, Jackson argues, by “the religious turn.” 
Religion supplies the other that is sought for in linguistic criticism and 
denied in materialist criticism. All in all, the “there” in phenomenology 
is more elusive than it is—or often seems to be—in deconstruction and 
cultural materialism.
Several essays in this special issue—most of them, in fact—absolutely 
deny the Narcissus effect. Jennifer Bates, Julia Lupton, Jennifer Waldron, 
and Michael Witmore are all concerned with group experience of live 
performance. In Witmore’s formulation, Shakespeare’s theater involves 
a “mobile capacity for feeling and, in effect, energizes it by distributing it 
across a group.” The locus of experience may ultimately be an “I,” just as 
it is in Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, but that “I” is immersed 
in a social and cultural environment that fundamentally shapes its iden-
tity. Phenomenology in its present guise, as practiced by the contributors 
to this issue of Criticism, is thoroughly informed by New Historicism and 
cultural materialism.
Any suspicion that phenomenology cannot be politically engaged—the 
Oscar Wilde effect—is answered by the ethical concerns of Paul Kottman’s 
essay on Romeo and Juliet, James Kearney’s use of Levinas to explore the 
possibility or impossibility or an ethical relation to “the stranger,” and 
Julia Lupton’s provocative suggestion that live theater enacts rituals of 
hospitality. All of these writers demonstrate that Shakespeare’s scripts are 
doing political work, but in terms far more complicated than the domi-
nance/resistance model that has informed political criticism in the past 
fifty years.
Potent challenges to the Euclid effect are offered by Jennifer Bates, Ken 
Jackson, James Knapp, and Jennifer Waldron. In the analyses carried out 
by these critics, phenomenology opens up experiences that lie beyond lan-
guage and hence beyond the confines of verbal syllogisms. For Bates, jux-
taposing Roman and Egyptian ways of thinking in Antony and Cleopatra, 
that open space is full of contradiction, a central fact of life as it is a central 
feature of theater. Ken Jackson and James Knapp both seize on Jean-Luc 
Marion’s notion of the “saturated phenomenon” to investigate experi-
ences that overwhelm comprehension. For Jackson, religion is just such 
a phenomenon; for Knapp, there is always something in Shakespeare’s 
images that exceeds cognitive labeling. Synesthesia, “sensing-with,” is the 
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essence of theater in Waldron’s analysis, not only because theater is a mul-
tisensory affair (all the perceiver’s senses are engaged) but also because it 
is a communal affair (all the perceivers are engaged at once).
Finally, Miss Emily Grierson is laid to rest in the attempts here to offer 
a specifically historical phenomenology. Husserl, Heidegger, and Mer-
leau-Ponty may have started with an “I” solidly situated in the present 
and proceeded from there to hazard universalizing generalizations about 
perception, but all of the contributors to “Shakespeare and Phenomenol-
ogy” carry out archival reconstruction. Waldron and Witmore trace (via 
Heller-Roazen) the origins of the concept of synesthesia to Aristotle and 
note the particular importance of the concept in Shakespeare’s time. “The 
common sense” in Aristotelian psychology still dominated the story peo-
ple told themselves in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries about 
what they were perceiving, and how. Lupton takes pains to fill the scene 
of hospitality with objects specific to Shakespeare’s time and place. Cur-
ran demonstrates that criminality in early modern terms embraced both 
deed and state of mind.
Fear not Merleau-Ponty.
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